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 Abstract
The object of the paper is to identify the conceptual underpinnings of the labour law 
reforms of the 1990s, particularly the concept of regulated fl exibility, and the changes to 
the labour market since then in order to review the performance of those reforms and to 
propose changes to more appropriately regulate that market. 
The main argument made in this paper is that the concept of regulated fl exibility may be 
put to good use in extending protection to those who most need it and limiting intervention, 
particularly judicial intervention, where there is no appreciable gain in protection. The paper 
reviews the regulation each of the standard incidents of the employment relationship, from 
recruitment to termination, and fi nds that much of this regulation (in the form of an unfair 
labour practice remedy) escaped careful scrutiny in the reform process in the 1990s. 
The unfair labour practice remedy has, for the most part, become a charter of rights 
for middle and senior management while the most vulnerable workers are left without 
protection. Rather than intensifying regulation, labour law reform should be setting its 
sights on the extension of protection to those who most need it, namely employees in 
atypical employment.
The paper makes various proposals to fi ne-tune the legal regulation of the labour 
market, in particular removing unnecessary regulation in the form of judicial interference 
in the employment relation and extending legislative protection to the most vulnerable 
employees.
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  1. Introduction
 1.1 Purpose and Structure of the Paper
The objective of this paper is to refl ect on three things. It seeks to identify the conceptual 
underpinnings of the labour law reforms in the 1990s, particularly the concept of regulated 
fl exibility, with a view to measuring the performance of those reforms today. It also refl ects 
on those aspects of the reforms that were intended but improperly realised in practice. 
It also considers the effect of the changes to the labour market since then and whether 
the conceptual structure is capable of accommodating those changes. All of which are 
important for any new phase of labour market reform involving a bridge between what the 
President has called the fi rst and second economies.
The structure of the paper is to set the context briefl y and then to give a general overview 
of the underlying thinking on regulated fl exibility. After that there will be a specifi c analysis 
of each of the incidents associated with the individual employment relation – from hiring 
to dismissal – to determine the need for, and effect of, regulation. And fi nally there will be 
a consideration of possible changes and mechanisms for accommodating the concerns 
of small business and the need for job creation without undermining the main purpose of 
labour laws namely the protection of workers, particularly the most vulnerable workers.
The main argument made in this paper is that the concept of regulated fl exibility may be 
put to good use in extending protection to those who most need it and limiting intervention, 
particularly judicial intervention, where there is no appreciable gain in protection. Because 
the remedies for unfair labour practices in the Labour Relations Act (LRA) have never 
been subject to any careful scrutiny, the need for, and effect of, providing these remedies 
need to be thoroughly reviewed – not just for small employers but for all employers. The 
unfair labour practice has become a charter of rights for middle and senior management 
while the most vulnerable workers are left without protection. Rather than intensifying 
regulation, labour law reform should be setting its sights on the extension of protection. 
Before commencing with the conceptual analysis of the labour law reforms, it is important 
to make a few general statements concerning the whole project of labour market reform. 
DPRU WP 06/109                                                      Halton Cheadle
               2 
 1.2 General Statements
The fi rst general statement is that we live in a constitutional state that has entrenched a 
bill of rights and, in particular, a suite of labour rights. These rights, together with other 
constitutional rights, commit the State to a social democracy. This means that the labour 
market policy choices are constrained and the justifi cation for any limitation of these 
rights is not simply a matter of economic choice.
The second is that the traditional model of employment (permanent full time employment 
with one employer until retirement) is steadily giving way to less stable (and often more 
vulnerable) forms of employment. This has two consequences for labour market regulation. 
The fi rst is that much of the regulation based on the traditional model is not suited to these 
new forms of employment. The second is that the modern labour market is dynamic and 
labour market regulation is always a step behind. As Paul Benjamin puts it: ‘Labour law 
is playing a perpetual game of catch-up. New forms of work are continually emerging 
and the law has to respond’.1 But it is not just the new forms of work that are changing 
– the nature and structure of the workplace, the organisation of work, the demands of the 
global market, the structures of ownership are all in fl ux, not as a transitional feature but 
as an end-state.
The third is that any systematic process of labour law reform requires proper information 
and research. There is insuffi cient information and research to properly understand what 
is taking place in the labour market in order to properly extend protection and adapt 
regulation to the changes in the labour market.
1 Paul Benjamin, ‘Beyond the Boundaries: Prospects for Expanding Labour Market Regulation in South Africa’ Paper  
 presented at The Scope of Labour Law: Redrawing the Boundaries of Protection, in Belliagio, Italy (May 2005).
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 1.3  The Background to the Labour Law Reform Process in 1994-1998
Minister Mboweni2 initiated a complete overhaul of the regulation of the South African 
labour market soon after the 1994 elections. That overhaul was outlined in the Department’s 
Five Year Plan and commenced with the review of the Labour Relations Act3 (‘the 1956 
Act’) and the appointment of the Presidential Commission into the Labour Market. 
The political imperatives for demonstrating results led Minister Mboweni to initiate the 
process of reforming the Labour Relations Act4 (‘the LRA’) even before the Presidential 
Commission had been appointed. Those same imperatives drove the conclusion of the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act (‘the BCEA’) before the Commission had completed 
its work. There are two aspects of this history that need to be stressed. 
Firstly, the policy underlying the LRA was never properly considered by the Commission, 
either on its own terms or as part of the labour law reform process as a whole. The 
reform of the LRA and the BCEA accordingly operated without a thorough labour market 
evaluation – either in respect of their particular subject matter or in respect of the linkages 
to other aspects of the labour market, such as skills development, social security etc.
Secondly, the phased nature of the negotiations prevented the presentation and negotiation 
of a single and coherent package of reforms. To some extent this can be attributed to high 
expectation of a broad social accord at the time and that the government’s introduction 
of meaningful reforms quickly would prove its commitment to protecting workers in any 
social accord. There had been a positive history of social dialogue and there was a real 
expectation of a broader social accord to stabilise and drive the post-apartheid economy. 
Negotiations between the social partners and government had preceded the start of the 
new democracy. The NEDLAC Act5 with its ambitious agenda for social dialogue was one 
of the fi rst new order laws to fi ll the post 1994 statute book and it specifi cally contemplated 
‘consensus’ and ‘agreements’ on ‘social and economic policy’. 
The accord never happened. Accordingly the different aspects of the labour law reform 
process, albeit always tripartite in composition, were separately introduced and negotiated. 
Many of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission never saw the light of day. 
2 Minister of Labour 1994 –1998; Governor of the South African Reserve Bank 1999 to present.
3 28 of 1956
4 66 of 1995
5 National Economic Development and Labour Council Act 35 of 1994.
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And those that were introduced (such as the amendment to give the Minister of Labour 
the discretion whether or not to extend sectoral collective agreements) were withdrawn in 
response to the fi erce opposition from the trade unions.
The effect therefore was that the labour law reform process degenerated into piecemeal 
negotiations. The danger of the present initiative to reform the labour laws is that it may 
become heir to this fragmented process unless a serious attempt is made to put together 
a whole package of reforms, protections and programmes. 
 2. Legal and Institutional Context 
 2.1 International Context
The legal context within which the policies underlying the LRA and the BCEA were 
formulated is not very different from the context that prevails now. The fi rst context is 
international law. South Africa is a member of the International Labour Organisation and 
has ratifi ed a number of ILO Conventions. This means that domestic policy and practice 
must comply with the ILO Constitution and the ratifi ed Conventions. The core Conventions 
relate to freedom of association, collective bargaining, discrimination, and child labour 
and forced labour. The provisions giving effect to these Conventions are not implicated in 
the current review although much can still be done on a programmatic basis to eliminate 
discrimination and child labour, and promote collective bargaining.
 2.2 Constitutional Context
The Final Constitution6 provides the next level of legal context. The Bill of Rights 
entrenches various rights that impact on the formulation of labour market policy and 
labour law reform. Those rights include the rights to equality, freedom of assembly, labour 
rights, access to courts and administrative justice.7 These rights are capable of being 
limited by a law of general application if they are ‘reasonable and justifi able in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom’.8 Accordingly it 
is possible to limit a constitutional right provided that it meets the constitutional standard 
of justifi cation. The limitations on the right to strike provide a good example. Section 23 
guarantees workers an unqualifi ed right to strike. The LRA, however, limits the right to 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.
7 Sections 9(1), 17, 23, 34 and 33 of the Constitution.
8 Section 36 of the Constitution.
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strike in a range of ways: strikes are limited to matters of mutual interest, in essential 
services and in respect of disputes of right.9 Those limitations are generally considered 
to be justifi able in open and democratic societies. Such limitations are accepted by the 
supervisory machinery of the ILO and exist in one form or another in most democracies.
At the time the policies underlying the LRA were being formulated, the fi nal Constitution 
had not been fi nalised and the interim Constitution10 was in place. Although there are 
differences in the manner in which the labour rights were cast in the two Constitutions, 
the differences are not material for the purposes of policy formulation then or now, except 
in so far as the structure and the jurisdiction of courts is concerned. 
It was constitutionally possible to have specialist appeal courts with equivalent status of 
the Supreme Court of Appeals under the interim Constitution. That became no longer 
possible under the 1996 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the Supreme Court 
of Appeals is the highest court of appeal except in constitutional matters.11 In a recent 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, the Court held that it had jurisdiction to hear 
appeals from the Labour Appeal Court.12 This has introduced an additional (and non-
specialist) tier of appeals in labour disputes.
 2.3 Institutional Context
Under the 1956 Act, the labour market institutions were the Department of Labour, National 
Manpower Commission (replaced by NEDLAC), the industrial councils (now called 
bargaining councils), conciliation boards (ad hoc boards convened by the Department 
of Labour) the industrial court and the Labour Appeal Court (a high court judge with two 
assessors). Although the institutional landscape remained similar in so far as collective 
bargaining is concerned, the real changes effected by the 1995 LRA was its introduction 
of new dispute resolution machinery – the CCMA and the Labour Courts and a new role 
for bargaining councils. Although the change of name looks superfi cial, a new kind of 
collective bargaining institution was intended.
9 Section 65(1) read with the definition of ‘strike’ in section 213 of the LRA.
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
11 Section 168(3) of the Constitution.
12 National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Fry’s Metals (Pty) Ltd  (2005) 26 ILJ 689 (SCA).
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 3. Regulated Flexibility
 3.1 The Concept of Regulated Flexibility
The concept of regulated fl exibility was developed by Paul Benjamin and based on 
the ILO Country Review.13 It informed the recommendations of the Labour Market 
Commission and the Minister of Labour’s approach to labour law reform. As the Review 
and the Commission noted, there are three kinds of fl exibility: employment fl exibility (the 
freedom to change employment levels quickly and cheaply), wage fl exibility (the freedom 
to determine wage levels without restraint) and functional fl exibility (the freedom to alter 
work processes, terms and conditions of employment etc quickly and cheaply).14 Security 
on the other hand is also made up of different forms. These were identifi ed as labour 
market security (opportunities for employment), employment security (protection against 
arbitrary loss of employment) job security (protection against arbitrary loss of or alteration 
to the job), work security (heath and safety in the workplace) and representation security 
(representation in the workplace).15 The concept of regulated fl exibility is not simply a 
balance between the two sets of interests but a framework within which an appropriate 
balance is struck. It accordingly concerns both limits and mechanisms. The limits should 
constitute the boundaries within which the mechanism determines the balance. 
Central to this concept of regulated fl exibility is the recognition that the labour market is 
both diverse and dynamic – one shoe does not fi t all and that a shoe that fi ts now does 
not fi t for all time. It is accordingly necessary in any framework to allow space within which 
employers and workers can adapt standards to suit the needs of any particular sector, 
sub-sector or workplace over time. There are several mechanisms that characterise 
regulated fl exibility and this conception of space within which choice can be exercised:
• The fi rst is ‘voice regulation’ – namely social dialogue (at national or regional 
level), collective bargaining (at sectoral or workplace level), workers’ 
participation (at the level of the enterprise) and employee consultation (at 
the level of the workplace). The balance is struck by accommodating the 
interests that each party brings to bear in these dialogues.
13 G. Standing, J. Sender and J. Weeks Restructuring the Labour Market: the South African Challenge: an ILO Country  
 Review (Geneva: ILO, 1996).
14 ILO Country Review p 6-7.
15 ILO Country Review p 8-9.
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• The second is administrative discretion bounded by clear guidelines on 
how the discretion is to be used. An example is the independent body to 
hear exemptions from sectoral collective agreements in accordance with 
established criteria based on fairness and the objects of the LRA.16
• The third is administrative determinations made by the Minister in the form 
of ministerial determinations in respect of any category of employees or 
employers or any particular employee or employer on application by the 
parties17 and sectoral determinations for any sector or area.18
• The fourth is what is called ‘soft law’. The LRA authorises the publication of 
Codes of Good Practice. Codes do not impose duties but set standards of 
behaviour. Deviation from those standards does not give rise to any penalty 
but may lead to an adverse fi nding in the CCMA or the Labour Court unless 
the deviation can be justifi ed. The primary mechanism is voluntary compliance 
and the secondary mechanism depends on the exercise of a discretion by the 
CCMA or the Labour Court in applying the code in assessing fairness, for 
example in respect of a dismissal.
• The fi fth mechanism is to set fl oors and ceilings within which the operational
requirements of different enterprises can be accommodated. Averaging hours 
of work in the BCEA is one example.19 The framework nature of sectoral 
collective agreements envisaged for bargaining councils would be another.
• The sixth mechanism is the selective application of legislative standards or 
requirements. The exclusion of employers with less than 50 employees from 
the affi rmative action provisions of the Employment Equity Act20 (‘the EEA’) 
is one example.21 The exclusion of upper echelon employees from some of 
16 Section 32(3)(e) of the LRA.
17 Section 50 of the BCEA. Ministerial determinations have been made in respect of the small business sector; welfare  
 sector; special public works program and the hotel trade (February 2003). See http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/  
 sectoral_index.jsp. 
18 Section 51 of the BCEA. Sectoral Determinations have been made in respect of  the contract cleaning sector ;   
 civil engineering sector; clothing and knitting; learnerships; private security sector; domestic workers; farm workers;   
 retail and wholesale sector; children in the performance of advertising artistic and cultural activities; taxi sector. See  
 http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/sectoral_index.jsp. 
19 Section 12 of the BCEA.
20 Act 55 of 1998.
21 Section 1 definition of ‘designated employer’ read with section 20.
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the provisions of the BCEA is another.22 It is this mechanism that is being 
proposed in respect of small business.
The legislation that sought to give effect to the concept of regulated fl exibility was itself 
subject to intense negotiation between the representatives of business and labour. In 
the legislation dealing with labour relations, the principle was given effect to by the 
promotion of collective bargaining, the choice of sectoral bargaining as the preferred 
but not compulsory level of bargaining, the enforceability of collective agreements, 
promotion of workplace forums and codes of good practice. In the legislation dealing 
with individual employment relations, the principle was given effect to by permitting a 
variation of employment standards through collective agreement, sectoral determination, 
the Minister and on occasion by the employees themselves, and codes of practice. That 
legislation also provided a set of default standards and an equitable remedy for individual 
unfair labour practices supported by codes of good conduct to guide workers, employers, 
arbitrators and courts. Accordingly, much of the debate concerning the appropriate level 
of collective bargaining and the continuance of sectoral bargaining in particular has a 
direct impact on the individual employment relation.
 
Although the concept of regulated fl exibility was given effect to, its effect was blunted 
because of the limits on the scope of variation introduced during the negotiations over 
the BCEA. Its effect has been further held back by the failure of the social partners to 
recognise the new role for collective bargaining and sectoral bargaining in particular, 
namely its role as the principal mechanism for striking a balance between the long term 
security needs of workers and the operational needs of the sector, sub-sectors and the 
individual employer. The detailed and prescriptive nature of current sectoral agreements is 
the antithesis of what was intended. This is one of the reasons for employer opposition to 
bargaining councils and since bargaining councils are necessarily voluntary in character, 
this opposition needs to be taken seriously.
The CCMA and the Labour Court have also played their part in blunting the effect of the 
concept of regulated fl exibility. As I discuss below, the CCMA and the courts have not 
followed the Codes of Good Practice (a feature of regulated fl exibility) and, for example, 
have over-proceduralised pre-dismissal hearings. 
The failure to review the residue of unfair labour practices inherited from the application 
of the 1956 LRA and their incorporation into the LRA without change and without codes of 
22 For instance, section 6 provides that Chapter 2 which regulates working time does not apply to senior management.
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good practice to guide workers, employers, their organisations, arbitrators and courts is a 
serious failing and has led to an unwarranted juridifi cation of the employment relation.
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 4. The Individual Employment Relation
  4.1 Introduction
The individual employment relation is made up of a range of different incidents – some 
of which were traditionally regulated and others not. The standard form of the individual 
employment relation is the contract of employment and the standard regulation was 
directed to the terms of the contract – both legislatively and through collective bargaining. 
It was only with the introduction of a remedy for unfair labour practices in 1979 that the 
other incidents of the individual employment relation became subject to judicial scrutiny. 
Both the original motivation for the remedy and the several defi nitions of the unfair labour 
practice demonstrate that it was not a carefully considered intervention.
It was, however, seized upon by trade unions representing black workers to craft a range 
of remedies: in collective labour relations (the right to strike and the duty to bargain) and 
in individual employment relations (the remedy for unfair discrimination, unfair exercise of 
managerial power and unfair dismissal). Indeed, the unfair labour practice jurisprudence 
developed by the courts under the previous Act was preserved in the 1995 LRA – but 
only as a holding operation. It was intended that this mixed bag of unfair labour practices 
gleaned from the jurisprudence would be considered fully and incorporated into the new 
individual employment law. But this did not occur and the transitional formulation of the 
individual unfair labour practice was simply imported into the unfair dismissal chapter with 
little change.
The concept of the unfair labour practice has had a charmed life. It started out for 
the fl imsiest of reasons.23 It spawned an ad hoc jurisprudence providing remedies for 
anything that could fi t within the loose language of its formulation. It took a constitutional 
form to protect the apartheid appointed public service. It was preserved as a transitional 
provision pending the review of the law regulating individual employment relations. And 
fi nally it was moved from its temporary shelter in the transitional provisions into the main 
23 It was introduced as part of the Wiehahn reforms brought about by the Labour Relations  Act Amendment Act of  
 1979. These reforms abolished the job reservation for white workers. There were fears that this left them vulnerable 
 to ‘irregular actions’ and dismissal for ‘all kinds of petty and unjustifiable reasons’ by ‘unscrupulous employers’ 
 wanting to replace them with black workers. The unfair labour practice was introduced as a necessary protective 
 mechanism for white workers. See A. Van Niekerk ‘In Search of Justification: The Origins of the Statutory Protection 
 of Security of Employment in South Africa’ (2004) 25 ILJ 853 853-861.
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body of the LRA. All this without ever any serious review of the need and scope for such 
regulation.
It is accordingly critical that one of the tasks of labour law reform should be to properly 
analyse the concept and its impact on the individual employment relation. Before doing 
this it is necessary to understand the importance of constitutinalising the unfair labour 
practice.
  4.2 The Constitutional Right to Fair Labour Practices
The most diffi cult of the labour rights for the purposes of policy formulation is the right to 
fair labour practices in section 23(1) of the fi nal Constitution. It is an odd right to have in a 
constitution and not found in any other constitution other than the Malawian Constitution, 
which took the wording from ours. 
The right to fair labour practices has three components: scope of the right holders, the 
concept of the labour practice and the concept of fairness. Each must be separately 
considered. All three are important to understand both the constraints under which the 
LRA and the BCEA were formulated and for current purposes.
Although ‘everyone’ has the right to fair labour practices, conceptually the scope of the 
right holders include only those involved in the employment and labour relationship 
namely employers, employees, trade unions and employer organisations. It is to be 
noted that the Constitutional Court has after the commencement of the LRA extended the 
meaning of worker to include those engaged in work relationships ‘akin to an employment 
relationship’.24 This has profound implications for both the scope of the current law and 
any labour law reform.
The concept of labour practice, as developed by the Industrial Court, includes, at the 
collective level, practices concerning trade union organisation, collective bargaining and 
industrial action. At the individual employment level, it includes practices concerning, 
appointment, terms and conditions, benefi ts, training, transfer, promotion, demotion, 
discipline and dismissal. This listing of practices constitutes a delineation of the scope of 
the concept. Although the courts and the academic writing on the subject have taken for 
granted that the right to fair labour practices in section 23 is extensive in scope, the scope 
needs to be reconsidered.
24 South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) at para 21-30.
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The operational principle in the concept of fair labour practices is fairness and that, the 
Constitutional Court has held, is a balance between the interests of workers on the one 
hand and employers on the other.25 Fairness, however, should not be limited to these two 
interests only – fairness should also take account of societal interests such as health and 
safety, the environment, community interests etc. 
There are four approaches to the determination of fair labour practices:
• if there is no legislative provision giving effect to the right, the courts may 
be required to develop the common law to do so;
• the legislation may give specialist bodies (the CCMA and the Labour 
Courts) the power to determine the fairness of employer or employee 
conduct;
• the legislation gives effect to the right by expressing the fairness in the 
legislation itself; and
• the legislation permits a variety of mechanisms such as collective 
bargaining or minimum wage fi xing to determine fairness.
The fi rst approach is limited to those labour rights not given effect to by the LRA and 
the BCEA. So for example, the labour practice of transferring an employee from one 
job to another or from one place to another is not one of the labour practices listed in 
the defi nition of unfair labour practices in section 186(2) of the LRA. Section 8(3) of 
the Constitution requires a court to develop the common law to give effect to a right ‘to 
the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right’. Accordingly, it is open to an 
employee who claims that a transfer is procedurally or substantively unfair to approach 
the courts for relief. And if a court holds that a transfer is a labour practice requiring 
constitutional protection, the fairness enquiry would be a balancing of the respective 
interests much in the same way as the courts did under the 1956 LRA. What is important 
to realise is that section 8(3) means that if the legislature decides to lift certain protections 
in respect of a certain category of employees, the protections may be resurrected under 
section 8(3) as a common law right. Take for example the proposal that bargaining council 
agreements and the BCEA do not apply to small business, whether completely or in part. 
The removal of those legislatively supported protections, quite apart from the equality 
25 National Education Health and Allied Workers’ Union v University of Cape Town [2003] BCLR 154 (CC) (2003) 24   
 ILJ 95 (CC) at para  38-40. 
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challenges that may be raised, will not, itself, necessarily remove the constitutional right 
to those protections. Any proposal to segment labour market regulation will require a 
careful constitutional analysis and justifi cation for it.
The second approach is legislation that establishes specialist courts and tribunals to 
determine fairness. The LRA establishes the CCMA and the Labour Court to do just that in 
respect of dismissal and the labour practices specifi ed in section 186. But, because of the 
constitutional nature of the unfair labour practice, the Constitutional Court has held that 
it has the constitutional obligation to monitor the operations of these bodies and to hear 
appeals arising from the interpretation or application of the provisions giving effect to the 
right to fair labour practices.26 The constitutional nature of the right to fair labour practices 
accordingly means that even if specialist tribunals are set up to determine fairness, they 
always remain subject to an appeal to the Constitutional Court, which has, of course, 
profound implications for dispute resolution. 
The third approach is legislation that seeks to strike the balance itself. Section 197 of the 
LRA, which deals with the transfer of employees arising from the transfer of a business (or 
part of it) as a going concern, is a good example. The Constitutional Court has held that 
the provisions of section 197 seek to strike a balance between the interests of employers 
and employees in the transfer of businesses.27  
The fourth approach is the use of legislatively created mechanisms and processes, 
rather than courts or tribunals, to determine the fairness of a labour practice. While the 
traditional way in which fundamental rights are vindicated is to institute legal proceedings, 
our Bill of Rights contains rights that are either not immediately realizable (the socio-
economic rights) or not effectively realised by the provision of a court remedy alone (the 
more programmatic rights such as those relating to security of the person, affi rmative 
action, the environment, housing, health, children and education). Salaries and wages, 
for example, are labour practices. But, there is no judicial or administrative remedy for 
an unfair wage or salary as there is for unfair dismissal, for example. Instead, the legal 
regime for the determination of fairness begins with the common law principle that a 
contract is a product of consent. The weaknesses generally associated with that consent 
are remedied by the legislative promotion of collective bargaining and, where there is no 
collective bargaining, by minimum standards legislation in statutes such as the BCEA and 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993. The constitutional guarantee of fair labour 
26 NEHAWU v UCT.
27 NEHAWU v UCT  at para 53.
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practices is accordingly secured by individual bargaining, supplemented by collective 
bargaining and underwritten by minimum employment standards legislation.
 4.3 The Nature of the Individual Unfair Labour Practice
Under the 1956 Act, the courts’ unfair labour practice jurisprudence applied to both 
collective labour and individual employment relations. Under the 1995 Act, those aspects 
of the jurisprudence relating to collective labour relations that were retained were codifi ed 
and fl eshed out – such as organisational rights and the right to strike. The jurisprudence 
relating to the individual employment relation was fully codifi ed in respect of dismissal 
but only roughly codifi ed in respect of the residue. The residue included the following 
unfair labour practices: unfair discrimination (later exported to the Employment Equity 
Act), unfair conduct relating to promotion, demotion, training, suspension, disciplinary 
action and the failure to reinstate or re-employ a former employee in terms of an 
agreement. The last practice highlights just how rough and ready the codifi cation was 
– it was unnecessary given the provisions relating to the enforceability of agreements 
and the jurisdiction of the CCMA and the Labour Courts to enforce them.
The jurisprudence and the codifi cation reveal two things. Firstly, whatever the reach of 
the residual unfair labour practice may be, it does not intrude into the substantive fairness 
of a term and condition of employment – that is left to collective bargaining and minimum 
standards legislation. Secondly, what is principally at stake in the concept of the unfair 
labour practice as it is encapsulated in the LRA is the judicial regulation of the exercise 
of employer power: the power to train, promote, demote, discipline and dismiss.
There are two practices codifi ed in the residual provision that do not readily fi t into this 
categorisation: the unfair conduct relating to the provision of benefi ts and the failure to 
reinstate in terms of an agreement. The latter should be disregarded because it was 
not necessary in the fi rst place and was simply a product of a haphazard jurisprudence 
developed by the industrial court. The unfair conduct relating to the provision of benefi ts, 
however, appears to reach into the substantive fairness of a term and condition of 
employment rather than the exercise of a power. The courts, however, have given the 
provision a restrictive interpretation by holding that benefi t means one that is conferred 
by contract or law – to hold the line between rights and interest disputes.28 But in so 
doing, the courts have vitiated the provision. It is not necessary to have an unfair labour 
28 HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (2000) 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC); Eskom v Marshall & Others  
 (2002) 23 ILJ 2251 (LC). See also Protekon v CCMA and Others (2005) 26 ILJ 1105 (LC).
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practice remedy if a remedy already exists under contract or the law. This brief excursion 
underlines an earlier point: the need for regulating these incidents of the employment 
relationship has never been properly scrutinised and is in need of review.
But not all incidents of employer power have been enumerated in the defi nition – such 
as the employer’s power to hire, to transfer and, within the confi nes of the contract, to 
direct what, how and when work is to be done.29 Not that these powers should be subject 
to judicial review – only that the policy considerations for including some and not others 
should be thought through and made clear.
I argue below that there is no need for the judicial regulation of the selection decisions 
(hiring, training, promotion) and those aspects of discipline short of dismissal (suspension, 
demotion and other disciplinary measures). It is not that I believe that employers 
should not act fairly but that the mechanism for ensuring fairness should not be judicial 
review30 but collective bargaining and structured worker participation. In other words the 
constitutional imperative for fair labour practices is sometimes set as standards and other 
times achieved through structures of social dialogue.
29 See for example the more extensive list of employment practices in the Employment Equity Act.
30 Except for unfair discrimination, victimisation, and, in the public service, for corrupt and inept selection.
DPRU WP 06/109                                                      Halton Cheadle
               16 
  5. Selection Decisions
  5.1 Recruitment and Hiring Practices
This incident of the individual employment relation is not listed as one of the practices 
covered by the defi nition of the unfair labour practice. Accordingly, there is no judicial 
scrutiny of an employer’s recruitment or hiring decisions. There are three31 exceptions:
• the two kinds of review, one judicial and the other administrative, contemplated 
under the Employment Equity Act;
• the judicial review of employer decisions for victimisation; and
• the judicial review under administrative law if the recruitment and hiring in the 
public service.
Outside these exceptions, there is no need to regulate this incident of the individual 
relation. There is no social or economic harm to employees that would justify a limitation 
of the employer’s right to direct its business as it sees fi t. In any event, the employer, 
whether public or private, is best placed to make the decision. The employer has an 
intimate knowledge of its short term and long term needs, its plans (whether equity, skills 
or operational), the job profi le and the competencies needed to match the profi le, which 
may include soft competencies such as personality traits and ‘corporate fi t’.
The policy considerations for the three exceptions are well founded. They give expression 
to four constitutional obligations – the prohibition against unfair discrimination, the duty to 
take positive measures to end unfair discrimination, the right to freedom of association and 
the right to organise, and the State’s duty to comply with the basic values and principles 
governing public administration.32 However, the remedies for breaches of two of these 
duties need to be reviewed.
31 The judicial scrutiny of hiring of new employees in the context of a retrenchment does not constitute an exception 
 because it is not the hiring that is attacked but the fairness of the retrenchment.
32 Sections 9(4), 7(2) read with 9(1) and (2), and 195. For the reasons set out later, I do not regard the right to 
 administrative justice in section 33 as a constitutional basis for the judicial scrutiny of the State’s hiring decisions.
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The mechanism in the Employment Equity Act for ensuring compliance with an affi rmative 
action plan is carefully crafted to ensure that there is minimal interference with an 
employer’s individual choices. It does this by measuring compliance over a period of time 
involving a number of hiring decisions. The breach of the duty to comply with an affi rmative 
action plan gives rise to an administrative procedure resulting in an administrative fi ne.33 
But the Act does not give an unsuccessful applicant the right to sue for breach. The aim 
of the Act is to ensure that the South African workplace is broadly representative not to 
confer rights on unsuccessful applicants.
The right not to be victimised for one’s trade union affi liation and activities34 is at once 
both a right not be discriminated against on grounds of one’s beliefs and a protection of 
the collective interests of the trade union. It follows that a decision not to hire a worker 
because of her trade union affi liation or activities is not solved simply by the payment 
of compensation. The remedy of requiring an employer to hire a victimised employee 
should be available to a court to prevent an employer frustrating the right to organise 
by simply paying compensation when caught. Each remedy is dependent on the policy 
considerations that informed the regulation in the fi rst place.
The remedy in respect of unfair discrimination is different again. Precisely because an 
act of unfair discrimination violates a person’s dignity, the remedy is rights based. And, 
because it is rights based, the remedy should be restricted to damages. This means 
that the applicant can sue an employer if the decision to not to hire her was unfairly 
discriminatory. But the remedy should not go to undoing the appointment or appointing 
her to the post. The object of conferring a claim was to redress the dignity violation not 
to review the operational correctness of the hiring decision. It may be necessary to make 
this clear in an amendment to the Employment Equity Act.
The remedy in respect of the State’s duty to comply with the basic values and principles 
governing public administration should be comprehensively reviewed. At present challenges 
to hiring decisions in the public service are being made under administrative law. Because 
a hiring decision is considered to be administrative action, an unsuccessful applicant 
can challenge the decision on the grounds that it was not substantively or procedurally 
fair. In administrative law the normal remedy is to undo the unfair administrative action. 
Damages are only awarded in exceptional circumstances. The problem arises because in 
our law the state’s employment decisions are subject to administrative review. 
33 Sections 42-45 read with section 50(1)(g) and Schedule 1 to the Employment Equity Act.
34 See section 5 of the LRA.
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Our courts extended the reach of administrative law to ensure fairness in the dismissal 
of public service employees at a time when the 1956 LRA did not apply to them.35 There 
is no longer any need to confer an administrative law remedy for unfair employment 
decisions because the LRA now applies to the public service. Moreover, the provision 
of two very similar remedies based on different policy considerations and determined in 
different courts will lead to forum shopping and an inconsistent jurisprudence. But more 
importantly, the policy issues that should inform the granting of a remedy in employment 
law become lost in a general right to test administrative action. This is particularly so in 
respect of hiring decisions. The object of providing a review of hiring decisions in the 
public service is to give effect to the constitutional values and principles governing public 
administration – in particular to prevent corrupt and inept appointments. Accordingly it is 
not the fairness of the decision that is at stake but whether the appointment was corrupt, 
inept or in breach of the public service rules aimed at preventing corrupt and inept 
appointments. The remedy ought to be to nullify the decision but never to countenance 
giving an unsuccessful applicant a claim to be appointed instead or for damages. 
To bring the law into line with this approach36 will require an amendment to the Public 
Service Act37 and possibly to PAJA.38
35 Langeni and Others  v Minister of Health and Welfare and Others (1988) 9 ILJ 389 (W); Mokoena and Others v 
 Administrator for the Transvaal 1988 9 ILJ 398 (W). See also Administrator Transvaal v Zenzile and Others (1991) 
 12 ILJ 259 (A) where the Appelate Division held that the employees were entitled to the benefit of the application of 
 the principles of natural justice before they could be dismissed for misconduct.
36 In English law‘ employment by a public authority does not per se inject any element of public law’. Thus, obligations 
 under an ordinary employment relationship are enforceable by ordinary actions and not by judicial review. This may 
 be different where the employment has  a statutory ‘underpinning’ such as statutory restrictions on dismissal. See H 
 W R Wade and C F Forsyth Administrative Law (8th ed)  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
37 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 193 of 1994.
38 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.
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 5.2 Probation
Probation is a vexed issue. Employers need it in order to assess the suitability of the 
employee in the work situation. If an employer is unable to dismiss an employee that 
proves to be unsuitable with relative ease during probation, the purpose of probation 
is undermined and may become a barrier to employment.39 On the other hand, there is 
the concern that unscrupulous employers will use the reduced level of protection during 
probation to dismiss employees at the end of the probationary period and to replace them 
with new employees. 
Nothing was initially said about probation in the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal except 
the general injunction that the Code was ‘intentionally general’ and that ‘departures from 
the norm may be justifi ed in proper circumstances’. Probation is such a circumstance and 
the CCMA should have developed less stringent standards for the fair termination of a 
probationary employee, but it did not. As a result the Code was amended in 2002 to set 
norms for the CCMA. Those norms include a thicket of evaluation, instruction, training, 
guidance and counselling requirements but a less stringent test for dismissal for poor 
work performance. Part of that package was to make unfair conduct (but not dismissal) 
relating to probation an unfair labour practice by including it in the defi nition of unfair 
labour practice.
Before engaging in a critique of this approach to probation, it is necessary to point out that 
had the CCMA commissioners understood the manner in which Codes of Good Practice 
worked – that they guide rather than prescribe and that departures from the norm can and 
should be countenanced – the problems with probation would not have arisen. 
There are several diffi culties with the approach adopted in the amendments to the Code 
and the LRA. The fi rst is that the less compelling standard for assessing the fairness of 
the dismissal of a probationary employee applies only to performance.40 But probation 
is also about testing the employee’s suitability in the workplace, which is a more diffi cult 
discretion to effectively review. This is why the lower standard is restricted to performance 
– an example of a policy driven by concerns related to the effi cacy of enforcement 
39 Article 2(2)(b) of the ILO Convention 158 on Termination of Employment of 1982  and Article 2(2)(b) of the ILO 
 Recommendation 166 on Termination of Employment of 1982 provide that probation is a permissible exception to the 
 unfair dismissal protections.
40 Item 8(1)(j) of the Code.
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rather than the effi cacy of the selection process. The trade off arises because the wrong 
regulatory mechanism is chosen.
The second problem is the inclusion of unfair conduct relating to probation (other than 
dismissal) as an unfair labour practice.41 The amendment was driven by the fear that the 
introduction of a less stringent standard would lead employers to repeatedly extend the 
probationary period. It is hard to conceive of any other reason that would justify extending 
judicial oversight to probation. If that is correct, there is much easier and more effi cacious 
way to address the problem.
The third problem is that the whole construct of regulation is easily avoided. The employer 
simply eschews a probationary period of employment and simply enters into a fi xed term 
contract of a few weeks or months to determine whether the employee is suitable. If the 
employee is not suitable, the contract terminates automatically at the end of the period. If 
the employee is suitable, the employee remains in employment. 
The solution to probation lies in the approach taken in other jurisdictions, namely that the 
ordinary unfair dismissal protections (ie other than automatically unfair dismissals) do not 
apply to employees with less than a stipulated period of service.42 An example is the UK 
where the qualifi cation period is one year.43 In order to prevent the abuse of terminating 
and re-employing just before the expiry of the stipulated period of employment in order 
to avoid the onset of the protections, the period of service should include all previous 
service with the employer or a related employer.44 Provision should be made to shorten 
or lengthen the qualifi cation period through sectoral collective agreements, sectoral 
determination or Ministerial discretion – to cater for the special needs of institutions such 
as universities, banks, doctors etc. This may be supplemented with providing a judicial 
review of stratagems to avoid the onset of the protections.
41 Section 186(1)(a) of the LRA.
42 This is known as the ‘qualification period’.
43 See the Department of Trade and Industry website at http://www.dti.gov.uk/er/individual/unfair-pl712a.htm
44 This is in line with the Article 3 of the ILO Convention 158 on Termination of Employment of 1982  and Article 3 of 
 the ILO Recommendation 166 on Termination of Employment of 1982 which require signatories to provide adequate 
 safeguards to prevent the circumvention of the protections. 
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 5.3 Training
Unfair conduct in relation to training was a ‘preserved provision’ awaiting detailed 
scrutiny when the legislation dealing with the individual employment relation was under 
consideration. Apart from discrimination or victimisation concerns,45 there is no need 
for judicial regulation of employer conduct in respect of training, particularly given the 
Department’s extensive programmes to train, re-skill and educate employees in terms of 
the Skills Development Act.46
 5.4 Promotion
The 1995 LRA provides a remedy for unfair conduct relating to promotion. The policy 
considerations justifying the judicial review of the employer decision to promote have 
never been aired. A promotion is an appointment of an employee to a higher post. There 
is little to distinguish between a decision to hire and a decision to promote. They are both 
appointments. In the one, the candidate is external and in the other internal. The very 
considerations that apply to hiring decisions should apply to promotion decisions. The 
decision to appoint or not to appoint a person is an operational decision like the decision 
to hire. There is no compelling policy reason to intervene in that decision except on the 
grounds referred to under the previous heading: unfair discrimination and proper public 
administration. To the extent that the employer has agreed to criteria for promotion and a 
promotion procedure, any review of a promotion decision is based on the breach of that 
agreement. But absent such a procedure, there is no good reason to interfere with the 
decision to promote. 
There is one aspect, though, that needs further analysis. Because an employment 
decision in the public service is regarded as administrative action and accordingly 
judicially reviewable, the administrative law doctrine of legitimate expectation has been 
applied in disputes concerning promotion.47 That doctrine permits a person who has a 
legitimate interest in the outcome of an administrative decision to challenge the fairness, 
45 In Transnet Ltd v CCMA and Others [2001] 6 BLLR 684 LC, the Labour Court held that a dispute relating to training 
 will only be covered by the unfair labour practice provision if it relates to inconsistency, arbitrariness or lack of due 
 process which infringes the rights of the workers. In MITUSA and Others v Transnet and Others [2002] 11 BLLR 
 1023 (LAC) the Court held that a legitimate expectation cannot create a contractual right to training. In the absence 
 of a contractual right, an unfair labour practice cannot be proved.
46 Act 97 of 1998.
47 Administrator Transvaal and Others v Traub and Others (1989) 10 ILJ 823 (A); IMATU v Stad Tygerberg (1999) 20  
 ILJ 971 (CCMA). 
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both procedural and substantive, of that decision. This public sector doctrine has now 
jumped species and, without proper consideration of the policy origins and implications of 
the doctrine, been extended by the courts to private sector employment.48 Accordingly, if 
an employer has by word or deed led an employee to expect that she will be promoted, 
the failure to promote that employee may ground a case challenging the employer’s 
decision. The importation of the doctrine into employment law has never been subject 
to any proper consideration of the labour market implications. Once every candidate is 
treated equally, the decision is not corrupt or inept, and any agreement or procedure 
relating to promotion has been followed, there is no justifi cation for interfering with the 
employer’s decision to promote or not to promote an employee. 
It is recommended that the reference to promotion in the defi nition of the unfair labour 
practice be deleted, that PAJA be amended to exclude the State’s employment decisions 
judicial review under that Act, and the Public Service Act be amended to provide a judicial 
or administrative remedy for corrupt and inept appointments.
48 February and Another v Nestle (Pty) Ltd (2000) 5 LLD 182.
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 6. Demotion 
The 1995 LRA provided a remedy for unfair conduct relating to demotion in its transitional 
provisions, but the policy considerations justifying the provision of this remedy have never 
been the subject of any serious review. 
Demotion arises in three contexts: as a disciplinary measure, as an alternative to 
dismissal for incapacity and as an alternative to retrenchment. Demotion is not normally 
contractually possible unless the employee agrees to demotion.49 In each case the issue 
will be whether the employee’s refusal of the demotion was reasonable. If reasonable, the 
dismissal,  for refusing to accept demotion, will be unfair. 
A demotion without consent is a repudiation of the contract, which entitles the employee to 
sue for breach of contract or to sue for unfair constructive dismissal.50 There is accordingly 
no need to protect employees from any unfair conduct relating to demotion. The rights 
and remedies are all in place under the law of contract and unfair dismissal to protect the 
employee from unfair or unlawful demotion.
The courts and the CCMA have held that demotion must be preceded by consultation and 
counselling and the failure to do so is an unfair labour practice.51 But if the demotion is 
unilateral, it is a breach of contract entitling the employee to the same relief under specifi c 
performance. This line of reasoning, however, is particularly dangerous because, followed 
to its logical conclusion, it means that an employer can demote an employee without that 
employee’s consent. All that is required is prior and proper consultation. The point is not 
consultation but consent. But this illustrates the dangers of providing remedies when 
there are already suffi cient remedies to secure the protection from the unfair exercise of 
employer power – the courts take pains to fi nd some reason for the existence of the unfair 
labour practice remedy.
49 Piki v Development Action Group Inc (2002) 23 ILJ 609 (CCMA); Egerton v Mangosuthu Technikon [2002] 10 BALR 
 1047 (CCMA).
50 Van Wyk v Albany Bakeries Ltd & Others [2003] 12 BLLR 1274 (LC).
51 Van Niekerk v Medicross Health Care Group (Pty) Ltd [1998] 8 BALR 1038 (CCMA); Van Der Reit v Leisurenet t/a 
 Health and Racquet Clubs [19970 BLLR 721(LAC); SALSTAFF obo Vrey v Datavia [1999] 6 BALR 757 (IMSSA).
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 7. Discipline (short of dismissal) 
Unfair conduct short of dismissal was inserted into the defi nition of the residual unfair 
labour practice as a holding operation pending the fi nalisation of the BCEA. The policies 
underlying the need to subject the employer’s power to discipline, outside of dismissal, 
to judicial scrutiny have never been properly considered or articulated. There is no good 
reason to subject this power to regulation once the power to dismiss as a disciplinary 
measure is regulated. The employer cannot fi ne. It cannot suspend without pay unless 
there is an agreement to do so.52 It cannot demote without consent. All it can do is to issue 
warnings. And warnings under a progressive system of discipline have a limited shelf 
life. In any event, if the employer relies on an earlier warning to justify a dismissal, the 
fairness of the warning and the disciplinary hearing can be raised then. There is just no 
good reason why the legislature should create a remedy for something that is suffi ciently 
regulated already. Far better to issue a Code of Good Practice and model disciplinary 
procedures as a guide to employers and trade unions as Namibia, Lesotho and Botswana 
have done.
The phrase ‘unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal’ is wide enough to form the basis 
for a claim for legal representation at the disciplinary hearing, even if this does not lead 
to dismissal.53
It is accordingly unnecessary if not dangerous to retain this unfair labour practice on the 
statute books.
 7.1 Suspension
 A remedy for unfair conduct relating to suspension is also one that has not been subject 
to any policy review. Unlike the other incidents discussed above, there is evidence of 
employees, particularly in the public sector, being suspended, sometimes arbitrarily, 
or placed on suspension for months, if not years, pending a disciplinary enquiry. So 
suspension accordingly merits serious review. In any such review, it is important 
to distinguish between different forms of suspension. There is suspension pending a 
52 There is only one exception – a limited statutory power in the public service.
53 See discussion on legal representation at disciplinary hearings below.
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disciplinary enquiry and there is suspension without pay as an alternative penalty to 
dismissal. 
Suspension as a penalty does not require an independent process of review because 
it may only be employed as a penalty if it is agreed. If the suspension without pay is 
unreasonable, the employee can refuse to consent and any subsequent dismissal is 
subject to judicial scrutiny. If suspension without pay is sanctioned in a collective 
agreement, the agreement itself provides remedies for non-compliance.
It is suspension pending disciplinary action that requires considered review. There are 
two abuses: arbitrary decisions and the inordinate periods of suspension. Suspension is 
the employment equivalent of arrest. The only rationale for suspension is the reasonable 
apprehension that the employee will interfere with the investigation or repeat the 
misconduct. It follows that it is only in exceptional circumstances that an employee should 
be suspended pending a disciplinary enquiry. The employee suffers palpable prejudice 
to reputation, advancement and fulfi lment. These limited reasons for suspension and this 
prejudice make a compelling case for regulation. And because any such regulation will 
have a minimal interference with operational decisions, there is no effi ciency trade off. 
But the regulation must be carefully crafted to target the abuse. 
It is not appropriate to regulate this issue by simply giving a court an unfettered jurisdiction 
to remedy unfair suspensions on an ad hoc basis. The proper approach is to address the 
mischief by identifying the basis for, and the form of, regulation. I have identifi ed two 
grounds. The fi rst is best regulated by judicial scrutiny of the decision supplemented by 
a Code of Good Practice. The second ground requires two forms of intervention: (a) the 
creation of a statutory obligation to conduct and conclude disciplinary hearings within 
a reasonable time and a power to strike down tardy disciplinary proceedings; and (b) 
institutional reform in the public service, namely an expedited process and independent 
institution to conduct disciplinary hearings.
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 8. Dismissal 
Unlike the residual unfair labour practice, the policies underlying the need for protection 
against unfair dismissal were thoroughly ventilated in the negotiations over the new LRA. 
The approach was to codify the jurisprudence that had developed under the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court since 1979. The object of the codifi cation was to 
make it clear what was expected of employers and workers. This was done in statute and 
in codes. The statute identifi ed the reasons on which an employer could never dismiss 
(the automatically unfair grounds)54 and the reasons on which an employer could dismiss 
(misconduct, incapacity and operational requirements).55  In the latter category – the 
dismissal had to be substantively and procedurally fair.56 
The standards of fairness were to be set out in codes of good practice updated from time 
to time in order for the codes to capture the emerging jurisprudence from the CCMA and 
the courts. The codes were to provide a legitimate, coherent, accessible and fl exible 
jurisprudence to guide employer policy and practice, collective agreements and dispute 
resolution. This is what the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal promulgated together with 
the 1995 LRA sought to do. 
The legitimacy dividend is achieved by the participation of social partners in the formulation 
of the code. A system of codes is an important process – it permits the social partners 
and the executive to enter into a dialogue with the arbitrators and the courts. Although 
the courts and arbitrators may have the fi nal word on the interpretation of a statute and 
a particular dispute, they do not have the fi nal word on the norms that should inform 
fairness decisions. Arbitrators and courts are required to take them into account. Codes 
are a form of employer and union participation in decision making – an attenuated form of 
employer and union assessors – a standard but expensive feature of dispute resolution 
elsewhere.
Coherence was achieved through codifi cation. But it was meant to be a living codifi cation 
and updated from time to time to keep up with decisions made in the CCMA and the 
Labour Courts. One of the objects of the Code was to move away from the system of court 
precedents and ad hoc development of jurisprudence – a system only easily accessible 
54 Section 187 of the LRA.
55 Section 188(1)(a) of the LRA.
56 Section 188(1) of the LRA.
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by consultants and lawyers – and move towards a system based on policy – which is 
directly accessible to users. Flexibility is inherent in the very concept of a code. As the 
opening line of the Code makes clear: the Code is ‘intentionally general’ and ‘departures 
from the norms established by this Code may be justifi ed in proper circumstances’.
But this has not come to pass. The Code is not systematically updated to keep up 
with the evolving jurisprudence of the CCMA or the Labour Court. This means that the 
Code becomes less relevant and must be supplemented or substituted by a system 
of precedent. Arbitrators write judgements when the object was that they should only 
give a brief summary of reasons. They seek to have their awards published and the 
legal publishers, keen to expand any market for their publications, publish the awards. 
Indeed one publisher publishes a separate law report on labour arbitration awards. The 
increasing number of published awards feeds an anxiety of an impenetrable set of rules 
that cannot be cut through without lawyers and consultants. It is an anxiety that lawyers 
and consultants deliberately feed.
The following should be done to recover lost ground. Firstly, the Code needs to be 
updated. It should not be a once off process but a set procedure. It may be best to 
have proposals developed by the Department or the CCMA and have those submitted 
to NEDLAC for consideration once a year. Secondly, the Governing Body should 
issue guidelines requiring explicit reference to the codes in their decisions and explicit 
justifi cations for any departure from the codes. Thirdly, the failure to take a code into 
account should be a ground for review or appeal. Finally, although the Code specifi cally 
refers to the size of the employer as a potential justifi cation for departure from its norms,57 
there is no jurisprudence on the subject. The arbitrators and the courts just do not take 
size into account. And yet the characteristic features of a small business, particularly 
a start up, such as the limits on internal expertise, the limits on resources, the lack of 
systems and the close nature of working relationships, call for departure from the norms. 
Procedural requirements for fairness must be simplifi ed – all that must be required is that 
the employee has been given an opportunity to be heard before dismissal. The personal 
nature of working in a small workplace must be factored into account in a similar way that 
57 Item 1(1) of the Code.
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he courts have developed more fl exible tests for substantive fairness in respect of senior 
management employees58.
For the reasons set out below, it may be best to produce a code for small business in 
which the special nature of small business is taken into account and make it obligatory for 
arbitrators to take the code into account if the employer is a small business.
 8.1 Dismissal (procedural fairness)
The LRA requires there to be procedural fairness before an employee is dismissed. In 
respect of misconduct and incapacity, the fairness procedures are set out in the Code 
of Good Practice: Dismissal. In the case of operational requirements dismissals, the 
procedure is set out in the LRA59 and supplemented by the Code of Good Practice on 
Dismissals based on Operational Requirements.
Misconduct and Incapacity
Quite apart from the general policy that hearing the other side is a fundamental tenet 
of fairness, the policies informing fair pre-dismissal procedures are: (a) procedural 
unfairness triggers industrial action; (b) it is consonant with good management practice 
and accordingly not invasive; and (c) the employee may put facts forward that demonstrate 
that dismissal is not justifi ed and accordingly prevent unnecessary disputes entering the 
system. 
But what those policies do not require is a formal hearing. The Code says there is no 
need for a formal inquiry, simply that there should be an investigation, proper notifi cation 
of the allegations, reasonable time for the employee to prepare a response, the right to 
be represented by a fellow employee or shop steward, an opportunity to respond to the 
allegations, and communication of the decision, preferably in writing.60
58 Serious consideration should also be given to excluding senior management and professional employees from unfair  
 dismissal protection (except dismissal on grounds of discrimination, victimisation, association etc) because they are 
 able to protect themselves contractually and because interference with termination decisions in respect of these 
 employees is more invasive and greater consequences for the efficient governance. 
59 Sections 197 and 197A of the LRA.
60 Item 4(1) of the Code of Good Practice: Dismissals.
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Despite the clear direction given in the Code, employers, consultants, lawyers, arbitrators 
and judges have continued to over-emphasise pre-dismissal procedures and in so doing 
have imposed an unnecessary burden on employers without advancing the protection of 
workers. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, the Industrial Court had developed 
a jurisprudence that imposed strict procedural requirements on pre-dismissal hearings. 
Secondly, employers had established complex disciplinary procedures under the old 
LRA but did not alter those procedures with the introduction of the 1995 Act. Thirdly, the 
arbitrators and judges, schooled under the old LRA, continued to apply the technical 
and exacting jurisprudence developed under that tradition. It is not surprising that faced 
with these arbitrators’ and judges’ decisions that the lawyers and consultants gave 
advice that protected the interests of their clients, which happily happened to coincide 
with their own. Finally, the model of disciplinary hearings developed under the 1956 Act, 
premised as it was on an analogy with criminal proceedings, did not die and give way to 
the model advanced under the 1995 Act, which is more analogous to procedures under 
administrative law that are more fl exible and based on the Code of Good Practice.
Until the courts and the arbitrators change their approach to the procedural fairness, the 
employers will continue to engage in costly formal hearings or pay dearly for not doing so 
– and without any advance in justifi able employment security. It is accordingly necessary 
to strengthen the Code to make its objective clear and to train and require commissioners 
to apply the Code.
Legal Representation at Disciplinary Hearings
In spite of a collective agreement that did not permit legal representation in disciplinary 
hearings, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that the agreement cannot exclude the 
common law and administrative law rule that legal representation should not as a matter 
of course be excluded and that in the appropriate circumstances legal representation 
should be permitted.61 The decision is based on administrative law principles that are 
not necessarily applicable to labour law. It is again an illustration of the need to properly 
review the application of administrative law principles to employment disputes.
More problematic is the extension of that logic to disciplinary proceedings in the private 
sector and, in particular to small employers. The existence of a remedy for unfair conduct 
61 MEC Department of Finance, Economic Affairs and Tourism, Northern Province v Mahumani (2004) 25 ILJ 2311   
 (SCA).
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in relation to discipline (short of dismissal) and procedural unfairness in pre-dismissal 
hearings provides fertile ground for developing the same rule in the private sector. 
It is critical that this issue be properly reviewed and that the necessary amendments to 
the LRA, PAJA and the Codes dealing with dismissal are amended. I believe that any 
limitation on the broad constitutional rights to fair labour practices and fair administrative 
action can be constitutionally justifi ed. 
Operational Requirements
The procedure for operational requirements is set out in statute. There is little room for 
procedural variation. In large scale retrenchments, the need for a clear pre-dismissal 
procedure is self-evident. But these procedures are not suitable for small businesses – 
they do not typically have the internal resources nor can they afford the external resources 
to advise them to follow the complex set of obligations and consultations before dismissal 
for operational requirements. It may be less onerous but without any loss of protection 
to exclude small business from the detailed retrenchment provisions in the LRA and 
to supplement the general duty in section to follow a fair procedure under section 188 
with provisions in a code setting out a simplifi ed procedure based on the principles that 
informed the more rigorous statutory procedures.
 8.2 Substantive Fairness
It is not readily appreciated that to a large extent, the courts and the arbitrators have 
recognised the principle that it is for the employer to determine workplace rules and that 
the fairness enquiry seldom interferes with the proper exercise of that determination. That 
is a demonstration of regulated fl exibility at work and properly applied for the most part 
by arbitrators and the courts.
Although highly controversial, the Labour Appeal Court has decided that an employer 
can fairly retrench its employees if they do not accept changes to terms and conditions 
of employment.62 Although, I do not agree with the decision because of its impact on 
collective bargaining, it is an illustration that the courts are a lot more sensitive to employer 
operational needs than is generally projected.
62 Fry’s Metal v NUMSA [2003] 2 BLLR 140 (LAC). This decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal and   
 indirectly by the Constitutional Court when it refused leave to appeal.
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 9. Terms and Conditions of Service
The defi nition of the unfair labour practice includes only one kind of term of service – 
benefi ts. It does not include unfair conduct in relation to other terms and conditions of 
employment. Although the setting of terms and conditions of employment is self evidently 
a labour practice, it is not one that the fairness of which is scrutinised by the courts. 
The legislature fulfi ls this constitutional obligation by providing a framework within which 
fair standards are set through contract, collective bargaining and legislation. Collective 
bargaining, however, is the primary mechanism. It is accordingly necessary to review the 
collective bargaining framework promoted by the LRA. But before commencing with this 
review it is best to briefl y deal with the unfair labour practice and benefi ts.
 9.1 Benefi ts
The remedy for unfair conduct relating to benefi ts was preserved in the transitional 
provisions of the LRA. On refl ection, it is diffi cult to explain its inclusion in the defi nition of 
the residual unfair labour practice because there appears to be no prior jurisprudence on 
the issue justifying its inclusion. All the more reason why its continued inclusion should 
be reviewed. Like so many other of the listed kinds of unfair conduct it does not appear to 
have any independent reason for inclusion.
The courts have had some diffi culty understanding what was intended by the inclusion 
of this remedy. They had diffi culties with distinguishing benefi ts from other forms of 
remuneration. They then had diffi culties with determining the ambit of unfair conduct and 
whether it included employer conduct in interest disputes (demands for new benefi ts or 
changes in existing benefi ts). The resolution of that conundrum in favour of restricting 
unfair conduct relating to benefi ts to a contractual or a statutory right to benefi ts63 means 
that there is no need for an unfair labour practice remedy because remedies under the law 
of contract or delict already exist. Recently, the court recognising this redundancy started 
seeking some other intention underlying the inclusion of the ‘benefi ts’ in the defi nition. It 
sought to do so by importing the administrative law principle of ‘legitimate expectation’ 
63 HOSPERSA v Northern Cape Provincial Administration (2000) 21 ILJ 1066 (LAC).
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into unfair labour practice jurisprudence and thereby applying the principle to employers 
in the private sector with no proper analysis of the implications of doing so.64
Outside of discrimination and victimisation, there appears to be no mischief that requires 
judicial review. The real mischief is its inclusion in the defi nition of unfair labour practice – 
it blurs the line between a dispute of right and a dispute of interest with all the implications 
that has for the right to strike.
 9.2  Collective Bargaining
Since the major mechanism for achieving regulated fl exibility was collective bargaining, 
it is necessary to briefl y deal with the thinking underlying the policy choice for a voluntary 
bargaining system and retaining but reforming sector level bargaining rather than 
establishing a compulsory system of bargaining at the level of the workplace.
I will argue that the changes in the labour market that have occurred since 1995 in 
particular, the growth in atypical employment, have made the retention and extension of 
sectoral bargaining even more imperative if current labour market policy is to remain true 
to some of its main policy objectives namely the promotion of collective bargaining and 
the protection of the marginalised.
Bargaining Levels
The fi rst and central issue was the choice of bargaining levels. There were two traditions. 
For over 70 years, the statutory system of collective bargaining was structured at the 
level of the sector – 50 years of which took place without the direct participation of trade 
unions organising African workers. The other tradition was at the level of the workplace. 
Excluded from the statutory system, trade unions that organised African workers sought 
recognition as collective bargaining agents at the level of the workplace and made use 
of the unfair labour practice remedy under the 1956 Act to compel reluctant employers to 
bargain with them. But by 1995 most successful trade unions were engaged in some form 
of collective bargaining at sector level. 
64 Eskom v Marshall & Others (2002) 23 ILJ 2251 (LC). The Labour Court found support for the application of the 
 doctrine of legitimate expectation but found that it was bound by the decision of the LAC in HOSPERSA .
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The policy choice was to continue with, strengthen and expand the coverage of sector level 
collective bargaining and to give bargaining councils the role of regulating bargaining at 
the level of the workplace. The policy reasons for the retention of sector level bargaining 
were:
• sector level bargaining is lower on transactional costs for employers 
and trade unions. The negotiations are conducted by representative 
organisations in respect of a sector or part of a sector as opposed to at 
every workplace by representatives of the employees and the employer;
• sector level bargaining shifts negotiations on the major issues out of the 
workplace with the intended effect of permitting more co-operative forms 
of engagement at the level of the workplace – more particularly workplace 
forums;
• bargaining outcomes at sector level set a competitive fl oor allowing for 
different or improved terms and conditions at the level of the workplace. 
By setting reasonable standards applicable to all employers in a local 
market, competition between those employers should be based on 
productivity rather than the socially undesirable reduction of wages or 
the extension of working hours;
• strikes and lockouts occur less often in a sector level system of collective 
bargaining and are less damaging to individual employers as between 
each other;
• sector level bargaining benefi t schemes are more cost effective and 
foster labour mobility within the sector.
The decision to leave the regulation of collective bargaining at the level of the workplace 
to the bargaining council or, where there was no bargaining council, to  the parties was 
informed by the following considerations:
• a system of compulsory bargaining at the level of the workplace had and 
would continue to undermine sectoral bargaining;
• where there were no sectoral councils, there would be no incentive to 
form a bargaining council if employers were already compelled to bargain 
at the level of the workplace;
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• there is a history of more than one trade union in the workplace. A compulsory 
bargaining system will raise serious diffi culties in accommodating a 
historical and structural diversity but limiting a proliferation of compulsory 
bargaining partners. Indeed one of the concerns raised by both trade 
unions and employers was the Industrial Court’s unsettling jurisprudence 
extension of the duty to bargain to new unions in units smaller than the 
workplace;
• a system of compulsory bargaining at the level of the workplace requires 
a regulatory regime that provides for the determination of threshold 
representativeness, bargaining units, bargaining subjects, and bargaining 
conduct. This determination is normally done by courts or tribunals and 
accordingly tends to be adversarial, invasive and rigid;
• all the benefi ts of a system of compulsory bargaining at the level of the 
workplace can be achieved through the guarantee of organisational rights 
at the workplace, a compulsory dispute resolution process and a right to 
strike. This aspect is discussed more fully below because it is a concern 
that continues to be raised by trade unions;
• it would give legislative support for a system of dual bargaining – a 
position strongly opposed by employers;
• the employers’ organisations were strongly opposed to compulsory 
bargaining and most trade unions were opposed to it because of 
its debilitating effect on collective bargaining generally and sectoral 
bargaining in particular.
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Most of these considerations were captured in the Explanatory Memorandum that 
accompanied the Bill in 1995:
‘[T]he fundamental danger in the imposition of a legally enforced duty to bargain 
and the consequent determination by the judiciary of levels of bargaining, 
bargaining partners, and bargaining topics is the rigidity which is introduced into 
a labour market that needs to respond to a changing economic environment. The 
ability of the South African economy to adapt to the changing requirements of a 
competitive  international market is ensured only where the bargaining parties 
are able to determine the nature and the structure of bargaining institutions 
and the economic outcomes that should bind them, and, where necessary, to 
renegotiate both the structures within which agreements are reached and the 
terms of these agreements…While giving legislative expression to a system in 
which bargaining is not compelled by law, the draft Bill does not adopt a neutral 
stance. It unashamedly promotes collective bargaining. It does so by providing 
a series of organisational rights for unions and by fully protecting the right to 
strike.’65
It is also important to note that this choice of voluntary collective bargaining is also 
consistent with the ILO Conventions 87 and 98,66 which stress the voluntary nature of 
collective bargaining. It is also consistent with decisions of the European Court of Human 
Rights to the effect that although the right to associate includes the right of a trade union 
to represent its members, the failure to provide a compulsory obligation to bargain does 
not offend the right to freedom of association if there is a concomitant right to strike.67
There is an argument that the constitutional right to fair labour practices and the right 
to engage in collective bargaining constitute a constitutional mandate for compulsory 
collective bargaining. However, the wording of the constitutional right was itself drafted 
to ensure that the guarantee was a freedom to bargain rather than a right to bargain (the 
corollary to the duty to bargain). But even if section 23 does grant a right to bargain, 
the grant of a right does not of itself mean that it has to be vindicated by a court or 
tribunal. The import of this proposition will be made clearer below when I deal with the 
constitutional implications for further labour market reform. 
65 GN 97 “Draft Negotiating Document in the form of a Labour Relations Bill” in GG 16259 of 10 February 1995.
66 ILO Convention on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 87 of 1948 and ILO Convention 
 on The Application of Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively 98 of 1949.
67 Wilson v UK [2002] IRLR 568 at para 45.
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Because some trade unions have continued to voice concerns over the voluntary nature 
of collective bargaining and the policy not to grant a system of compulsory bargaining at 
the level of the workplace, it may be important to deal with these concerns in a little more 
depth. The model68 of compulsory bargaining at the level of the workplace is one in which 
a trade union is granted the right to bargain if it has majority support in an appropriate 
bargaining unit. The right to bargain means that the employer has the concomitant duty 
to bargain and a breach of that duty is an unfair labour practice. Under the model, no 
organisational rights are conferred and, unless those rights are agreed, a trade union 
will have to strike to secure those rights. Even if an employer enters into a recognition 
agreement, the duty to negotiate on wages and working conditions does not amount to a 
duty to agree and if an employer refuses to accept the trade union’s demands, workers 
will have to strike to secure an agreement. It must also be understood that under the US 
version of this model there is no compulsory statutory system of dispute resolution in 
terms of which an interest dispute must be referred to conciliation before proceeding on 
a strike.
If one compares the model of compulsory bargaining at the level of the workplace with the 
model endorsed by the LRA, the following is evident:
• the compulsory dispute resolution system in the LRA establishes a 
compulsory forum for deliberations over recognition disputes;
• that compulsory system also to some extent supplants the need to have 
a judicially enforceable duty to bargain because the system establishes a 
compulsory forum for the resolution of interest disputes even for minority 
trade unions;
• the LRA confers organisational rights on trade unions that meet the 
thresholds of representativeness, some of which are less than a 
majority;
• that, under both models, the resolution of interest disputes is secured 
ultimately by the exercise of the right to strike.
Accordingly, even if trade unions have lost recognition since the introduction of the 
1995 Act they may not have been entitled to recognition under a compulsory collective 
68 The model has its origins in the 1935 US National Labour Relations Act Title 29 USC 158.
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bargaining regime. At least under the 1995 LRA, they may retain basic organisational 
rights even if they no longer command majority support in the workplace.69
 9.3 Overhaul of Sector Level Bargaining
The retention of the sector collective bargaining system did not mean that the system 
was not in need of a serious overhaul. But the policy of deepening and expanding the 
coverage of bargaining councils is not achieved by legislative fi at – it required the social 
partners and particularly the State to drive the implementation of the policy. The sorry 
state of sectoral bargaining eight years after the commencement of the LRA is testimony 
to the failure to do so.
The fi rst problem that required attention was the fragmentary coverage of bargaining 
councils with most workplaces not covered by sectoral bargaining. Most councils were 
not truly sectoral – some covered parts of a sector, some were not national in scope 
and others overlapped. The Department had a critical role in the consolidation process 
and the establishment of new bargaining councils. For example the National Industrial 
Council for the Engineering Industry was established in 1940s after the Minister of Labour 
had convened a meeting of the trade unions and employer organisations in the industry 
and encouraged the parties to create a national industrial council. A similar role was 
envisaged for the Department post 1996 but it has failed to convene meetings of employer 
organisations and trade unions operating in the same sector to commence and facilitate a 
process for the establishment or consolidation of councils. 
The second and related problem is the lack of a broad demarcation of sectors. Although 
the Department developed proposals for a broad demarcation of sectors and submitted 
those proposals to NEDLAC for consideration, no agreement was ever reached. Moreover 
there is no correlation between the sectors contemplated in the LRA and the use of the 
concept for sectoral determinations under the BCEA or sectoral training and education 
authorities under the Skills Development Act.
69 A union need only be ‘sufficiently representative’ of a workplace to claim right of access to the workplace and to the 
 deduction of subscriptions in terms of sections 12 and 13 of the Act.
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It was envisaged that the bargaining councils would perform new and enlarged functions. 
Legislative effect was given to do this. The legislative changes effected in 1996 were as 
follows:
• the council’s role was expanded to regulate collective relations in the 
sector: organisational rights, workplace forums, bargaining at the level of 
the workplace (through its power to determine on what matters workers 
can strike or employers can lock out at the workplace), enforcement of 
collective agreements and dispute resolution;
• the council’s role was extended to include the development of sectoral 
policy for submission to NEDLAC or other appropriate forum.
This role was further extended in 2002 when the 1995 LRA was amended to include two 
further functions:
• to provide industrial support services within the sector; and
• to extend the services and functions of bargaining councils to workers in 
the informal sector and home workers.
But it is not suffi cient to simply legislate. It is critical for the social partners and State 
to drive the policy. There is continuing failure to provide the subsidies that would assist 
councils to perform their dispute resolution functions effectively. There is little evidence of 
the councils giving effect to many of their roles and it falls to the Department to develop 
programmes to assist councils in implementing the new policies. 
The third problem was the role that bargaining councils were to play in the setting of terms 
and conditions of employment within their respective sectors. In the context of labour 
market regulation, bargaining councils give effect to an important principle and important 
regulatory functions.70 The principle is that of self-governance or voice regulation. Under 
this principle, terms and conditions, particularly wages, are not set by government but by 
employer and worker organisations in the sector. The regulatory functions of bargaining 
councils are to establish terms and conditions that fi t the needs of the sector and, through 
extension, to set minimum standards for the sector. 
70  Of course, sector level bargaining also performs other labour market functions but these are its regulatory functions.
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Although the standard form of regulating employment protection is to legislate basic 
standards and to establish wage-fi xing machinery to set minimum wages, the model 
adopted in the Industrial Conciliation Act71 and the Wage Act72 was to harness sector level 
bargaining as the mechanism for fi xing wages and employment standards in those sectors 
in which industrial councils were registered. In the sectors without sectoral collective 
bargaining, the Minister set minimum wages and standards on the recommendation of a 
Wage Board. That model was adapted and retained in the new LRA and BCEA and the 
reasons for doing so are dealt with separately.
In order to remain true to the principle of self-governance, the new LRA should have 
retained the articulation between sectoral collective agreements and the minimum 
standards legislation that had been the case under the 1983 BCEA.73 Under that Act, 
sectoral agreements (then called industrial agreements) could set terms different from 
those contained in the BCEA even if those terms were less favourable. The retention of 
this articulation in the new BCEA was strongly resisted by the trade unions because they 
feared that it would lead to concession bargaining and the gutting of the basic protections. 
The fears were largely unfounded because there had been little evidence of concession 
bargaining during the 13 years that the 1984 BCEA had been in existence. Concession 
bargaining was generally a feature of workplace level bargaining. And fi nally concession 
bargaining is normally conducted in a context in which there was no default statutory fl oor 
of protections.74 What was lost was an effective and dynamic mechanism for varying the 
basic statutory standards to suit the special features of the sector or sub-sectors and the 
loss of a powerful inducement on the part of employers to establish, consolidate and join 
bargaining councils. Not every adaptation of a basic standard constitutes a concession or 
a diminution of the standard.
The regulatory function of sectoral collective bargaining to establish terms and conditions 
that fi t the needs of the sector or sub-sector has been curtailed. The regulatory model 
of fi xing minimum standards, wages in particular, through the extension of the sectoral 
collective agreements to non-party employers and employees within the sector has 
recently become controversial despite it having been the model for standard setting 
71 11 of 1924
72 27 of 1925
73 Act 3 of 1983
74 In other words, if no collective agreement is concluded, the basic standards apply. It is only when there is a  
 collective agreement on the standard that the statutory standard gives way to the agreed one.
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for over 70 years. Part of that controversy arises from the form and nature of sectoral 
agreements. 
The regulatory function of sectoral collective bargaining dictates that the sectoral 
agreements set minimum wages and working conditions and that actuals are determined 
at the level of the workplace. The intention was that bargaining councils would set 
framework agreements and that any supplementary bargaining would be done at the 
level of the enterprise or the workplace. The Labour Market Commission captures this 
intention in its Report: 
‘The council should set the rules of the game, dealing with some items centrally 
and channelling others to enterprise or company level negotiations. It might, 
for example, set minimum conditions and outline the parameters within which 
supplementary bargaining could take place. This approach would allow a 
bargaining council to determine the minimum hourly rate and percentage 
increase but enable supplementary increases, linked, say to a productivity or 
profi t sharing arrangement. This could promote enterprise effi ciency, grant 
workers a share in the fruits of such gains, and set realistic minima for the less 
profi table enterprises, while at the same time moderating undue wage drift 
between enterprises within one sector.’75
The failure to understand the regulatory functions of the bargaining council agreement 
has led to parties agreeing to actuals and accordingly setting no framework for variation at 
the level of the enterprise or workplace to accommodate differences between employers. 
A cursory look at the bargaining council agreements concluded since 1996 will reveal 
that very little has changed – most have retained the content and in some instances 
the wording of agreements concluded twenty and thirty years ago. Instead of setting a 
minimum entry-level wage, the agreements set wages for every level of job regardless 
of whether the job or level is appropriate to an individual workplace. At a time when job 
profi les, work organisation, technology and processes were similar across an industry or 
a service, it made sense to set minima for each category of job. But the new imperatives 
require a different form of agreement. Because employers were required to respond 
quickly to changing markets and technology, it was critical that the bargaining council 
decentralise bargaining in a structured way and that the sectoral agreement provide a 
framework for such bargaining.
75 Restructuring the South African Labour Market: Report of the Commission to Investigate the Development of a 
 Comprehensive Labour Market Policy (Pretoria: Department of Labour, 1996) at para 173.
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This is a programmatic failure and requires a determined Department of Labour to develop 
a programme which must include a draft policy on the nature and content of sector level 
agreements for submission to NEDLAC for its consideration and agreement.
 9.4 Extension of Collective Agreements
The ongoing controversy76 over the extension of bargaining council agreements to all 
employers and employees in a sector, regardless of whether they are parties to the 
agreement or not is partly shaped by the failure to craft framework agreements at sector 
level. But it is also shaped by the automatic nature of the extension if the parties to the 
agreement are representative or the semi-automatic nature of the extension if the parties 
to the agreement are only suffi ciently representative. 
This approach to the extension of sector level agreements arose from the abuse of the 
Ministerial discretion under the 1956 Act.77 But there was no need for an automatic or 
semi-automatic extension mechanism to prevent such abuse – the constitutional right to 
fair administrative action provides adequate protection. 
Whatever the reasons motivating the automatic and semi-automatic extension of 
sector agreements, the mechanism is at odds with the regulatory function of sector 
level agreements. They constitute a form of minimum standard setting. And as such 
the Minister should have a greater discretion – one that places less emphasis on the 
representativeness of the parties and more on the agreement’s alignment with the 
government’s labour market policy. The discretion will have a disciplining effect on the 
kinds of agreements that bargaining councils submit for extension.
A few cautionary remarks: fi rstly, what is being proposed is controversial but not new 
– it is a recommendation of the Labour Market Commission; secondly, the discretion is 
not an open discretion but one based on a published labour market policy after being 
negotiated at NEDLAC; and thirdly, the implementation of a discretionary extension 
mechanism should be carefully introduced and complemented by guidelines and codes 
of good practice.
76 That controversy has given rise to a challenge to the constitutionality of the extension mechanism in section 32 of  
 the LRA.
77 For example the refusal to publish industrial agreements because they included ‘revolutionary holidays’ such as 1   
 May and 16 June.
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 9.5 A New Role for Sector Level Bargaining
The growth of atypical labour has been so steep that some have questioned whether 
these forms of labour should continue to be called atypical. While some of this growth 
is attributable to the knowledge economy, the real growth is due to the externalisation, 
casualisation and informalisation of labour. These employees fall outside the regulatory 
net of traditional labour law. There are various reasons for this regulatory hole. 
The model of employment on which our labour law is based, namely a model of full-
time life-time employment with one employer, is not appropriate for these forms of 
employment. Even in the formal sector, the traditional model is not the norm – modern 
formal employment is characterised by many important transitions in and out of full time 
employment.
The various contractual and institutional forms of these kinds of employment mean that 
many workers do not fall within the common law conception of the contract of employment 
and accordingly are not subject to protective reach of labour legislation. Some fall within 
the defi nition but their employment is so precarious, indirect or informal that they become 
invisible for recruitment into trade unions or for protection through law enforcement.
One of the implications of this process of marginalisation is the segmentation of the 
workplace: there is a polarity between those in full time employment with the employer 
and those in casual employment; and there is a polarity between those employed by the 
employer (both full time and casual) and those employed by other employers (contractors 
and labour brokers).
Collective bargaining at the level of the workplace will result in only some of the employees 
who work at the workplace being given a collective voice. This result is partly because of the 
diffi culty in organising casual workers and to a large extent because many of the workers 
will be employees of other employers (contractors and labour brokers). While collective 
bargaining is notionally possible between a labour broker and its employees, the nature 
and form of employment militates against it. The employees work on a fragmented basis 
and their terms are determined by the contract between the broker and the employer. The 
only form of collective bargaining that will give those workers a voice and will provide a 
level of protection is sector level bargaining. To some extent that was already envisaged in 
respect of the current provisions dealing with labour brokers and inter-bargaining council 
agreements. But in order to effectively regulate casual and externalised employment it is 
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important for the bargaining councils to conclude agreements that are appropriate for this 
form of employment. 
Collective agreements should apply to all forms of dependent work and this may need an 
amendment to the LRA although it is possible to enforce any agreement relating to casual 
and externalised labour through the employer. The extension of these agreements must 
however be subject to the Minister’s discretion set within an agreed policy framework.
The extension of collective bargaining to all forms of dependent work is not only 
constitutionally possible but it may even be mandated. The Constitutional Court has held 
that the labour rights in section 23 apply to workers both employees and those who are 
‘akin to employees’.78
But the real possibilities for adapting labour law to these new forms of labour require a 
serious overhaul of the bargaining councils including the development of policies and 
guidelines on the nature of these agreements.
78  South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another (1999) 20 ILJ 2265 (CC) Par 21-30.
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 10. Conclusion 
As important as the bridge is between the fi rst and second economies and the role that 
small business is to play in providing that bridge, there are also important elements of 
labour market regulation in the fi rst economy that require attention – not just for its own 
sake but also to abate employer and investor perceptions of rigidities in the South African 
labour market. The proposals arising from this paper are described below.
Any adaptation of the law to meet the needs of small business raises the diffi culty of 
the defi nition of small business. Although the simplest mechanism is to defi ne small 
by reference to numbers, the use of this mechanism falls prey to giving primacy to the 
concerns of implementation and enforcement over the motivating purpose for the policy 
of differentiation. The more nuanced defi nition by turnover is on the face of it more diffi cult 
to implement and enforce. But this may be simply resolved by arranging with the South 
African Revenue Services that businesses under a certain turnover be issued with an 
annual certifi cate to that effect. Employers with that certifi cate then become entitled to 
the special regulatory environment provided for small business within the framework of 
existing labour law protections. Those small employers who do not register for tax and 
obtain the certifi cate are not entitled to the difference in treatment and the full force of the 
labour legislation applies.
Any differences in treatment for small business needs to withstand constitutional scrutiny 
and accordingly the possibility of blanket exclusion from the provisions of labour legislation 
is not a possibility – any limitation of rights or difference in treatment must not only be 
justifi ed but carefully targeted.
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 10.1 Unfair Labour Practices and Small Business
I have argued that there is no need to provide a remedy for the unfair labour practices 
listed in the defi nition in section 186. That argument is made irrespective of the size of the 
employer.79 But whatever the force of those arguments may be, there is just no reason 
for them to apply to a small business. They are by their very nature incidents associated 
with larger employers.
 10.2 Law of Dismissal and Small Business
It is not constitutionally possible to exclude small employers from dismissal protection80. 
The Constitutional Court has held that protection against unfair dismissal is at the core 
of the concept of the unfair labour practice. The common law does not provide effective 
protection against unfair dismissal and in this it is different from the other of the unfair 
labour practices listed in the LRA. The employees of small employers are a more vulnerable 
class of employee and their need for protection will weigh heavily in any court evaluation 
of the limitation of the right in respect of small business. And the economic evidence 
that dismissal protection negatively affects employment growth is tenuous and equivocal. 
Small business should be excluded though from the statutorily entrenched procedure in 
section 189 but subject to a code of good practice that will provide for a simpler procedure 
based on the same principles that informed the procedure in section 189.
There should be a separate code of good practice published for small business, which 
incorporates the principles of a fair dismissal under section 188 but adapts them to the 
exigencies of small business. As a separate document, it will be more easily accessible 
and distributable through the outreach services to small businesses provided by the 
Department of Trade & Industry.
79 The protection against victimising an employee for making protected disclosures under the Protected Disclosures 
 Act should be retained but not as an unfair labour practice but under the victimisation provisions in Chapter 2 of the   
 LRA.
80 Ironically it may be constitutionally possible to exclude senior management from dismissal protection  or unfair  
 labour practice protection precisely because senior management can (and very often do) protect themselves   
 contractually from unfair employer practices.
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 10.3 Terms and Conditions of Service and Small Business
The BCEA already provides for a difference of treatment between different classes of 
employee. In principle, there is no reason in principle why certain provisions of the BCEA 
could not accommodate a difference in treatment in respect of small business. But in 
practice it is going to prove very diffi cult to identify the provisions. It requires a separate 
and targeted instrument to properly balance the interests of the small employer and the 
interests of those who work for the small employer. It is for this reason that I advocate the 
use of sector level agreements and sectoral determinations as the instruments to achieve 
this. But reliance on these mechanisms requires changes to both law and practice. In 
summary those are:
• amendments to the LRA relaxing the representativeness requirements 
for bargaining councils and granting the Minister the discretion to extend 
sector agreements (or parts of them) to non-parties in accordance with 
the published labour market policy of the government;
• the development of labour market policy, code of good practice or 
guidelines on the nature and content of sectoral agreements, in particular 
the kinds of agreements or provisions that are to be extended;
• amendments to the BCEA to permit greater variation of employment 
standards (not those relating to forced labour and child labour) by sector 
level agreements and determinations and an amendment to permit a 
determination in respect of small business across sectors subject to the 
existence of sector level agreements.
 10.4 Other Reforms that Require Attention
The growth in atypical labour requires urgent attention. It is not a question of whether to 
include or exclude them from the protective net of labour legislation. They are subject to the 
constitutional guarantee of fair labour practices. The question is how best to protect them 
while taking the other objectives of labour market policy into account. The most effective 
mechanisms remain sectoral agreements or in their absence sectoral determinations. 
The LRA and the BCEA ought to be amended to permit sectoral agreements and 
determinations to reach beyond the contract of employment and apply to all forms of 
Regulated Flexibility and Small Business:Revisiting the LRA and the BCEA
              47 
dependent labour. Labour market policy should be formulated to guide bargaining councils 
and the Employment Standards Commission in regulating these forms of employment.
The provision of remedies for the kinds of labour practices listed in the defi nition of the 
unfair labour practice (other than victimisation for making protected disclosures) ought to 
be removed for the reasons outlined above. 
There should not be two systems of law in the public service. Employment decisions should 
not constitute administrative action for the purposes of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act. Special remedies for corrupt or inept employment decisions should be 
provided for in the Public Service Act. 
The future of sectoral collective bargaining depends on a concerted effort and vision 
to strengthen and deepen sector level bargaining. It is accordingly critical to agree to 
demarcate the sectors and for the Department to develop a strategy to consolidate 
existing bargaining councils and facilitate the establishment of bargaining councils in 
sectors where there are no councils. The process of making a sectoral determination 
should include facilitating negotiations between employer organisations and trade unions 
in the sector along the lines proposed in recent Tanzanian labour legislation.
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